What is a ‘disposition’? What relevance does the notion of disposition have for attributions of intelligence, according to Ryle?


Answer the following questions as best as you can. Please number your answers, write them in complete sentences, and use examples when appropriate.

(1) What makes Descartes think that the mind is a special kind of thing distinct from the body?

(2) What is a ‘disposition’? What relevance does the notion of disposition have for attributions of intelligence, according to Ryle?

(3) Fine says that shifts in self-concept can bring about changes in behavior. What does she mean by “self-concept” and what are some examples of how changes in self-concept affect behavior?

I need you to answer the all the questions and for question 3 I need 2 different copies

Thank you

This is answers of question 1-2 from my friend

What makes Descartes think that the mind is a special kind of thing distinct from the body?

First, we must understand the real distinction Descartes holds for substances and modes. Substances is defined by Descartes as the ability for something to exist without the dependence of other creatures and can only be created under Gods concurrence. Furthermore, a mode is defined as the quality of a substance that is dependent on the substance itself alongside Gods concurrence. Given that substances are self sufficient in that they are not dependent on other substance, Descartes makes the distinction in further that the body and mind could be separate from one another yet is dependent on God to make this choice. This in turn, leads us to Descartes finding of whether he can believe in his own existence as a creation from God.

“But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum ) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.” (2.3)

“By body I understand all that can be terminated by a certain figure; that can be comprised in a certain place, and so fill a certain space as therefrom to exclude every other body.” (2.5)

As this follows his evil demon logic, it is then understood that just as the demon cannot deceive Descartes in his existence, it is that we must reflect on the possibility of external physical things to not exist to be plausible. This then leads to Descartes premises of the mind body problem.

“And, firstly, because I know that all which I clearly and distinctly conceive can be produced by God exactly as I conceive it, it is sufficient that I am able clearly and distinctly to conceive one thing apart from another, in order to be certain that the one is different from the other, seeing they may at least be made to exist separately, by the omnipotence of God; and it matters not by what power this separation is made, in order to be compelled to judge them different; and, therefore, merely because I know with certitude that I exist, and because, in the meantime, I do not observe that aught necessarily belongs to my nature or essence beyond my being a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists only in my being a thinking thing or a substance whose whole essence or nature is merely thinking]. And although I may, or rather, as I will shortly say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I, that is, my mind, by which I am what I am], is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it.” (6.9)

If Descartes can distinguish “ clearly and distinctly” the state of affairs as possible due to the possibility of Gods influence, then it is clear that the body and mind are distinct. As Descartes has come to that conclusion from Meditation 1 & 2 that he cannot doubt his existence but not of the existence of modes/material. By being able to clearly and distinctly of something to be possible under the omnipotence of God, then it is possible to conceive that case to be possible.

What is a disposition? What relevance does the notion of disposition have for attributions of intelligence, acoording to Ryle?

According to Ryle, a disposition is a tendency to explain various behaviors not in that is observable but of what the person exhibiting those tendencies know, feel, desire and etc..

Ryles states that the nature of a persons motive arises from circumstances in which they act on, but that action may not be inherent in their mental process, but rather be explained by that persons behavior. Dispositions however, do not reside in this inherent mental process and cannot be put down or situated in place. By recognizing that the mind is dispositions of behavior, Ryle furthermore explains that our mind understands words and subjects via a method that is beneficial for our own purpose which then allows you to behave a certain way. As our minds is a sum of our dispositions, it is then understandable that it is visible and evident rather than a hidden ghost.

From this, we gain a understanding that Ryle places dispositions as not of that similar to perception or moods. His reasoning follows in the attribution for intelligence, by stating the causation for intelligence in behavior is of that of behavior. An example of as someone who exhibits pain behavior during their experience of pain.